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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 09/07/2011

Accident number: 729

Accident time: 11:00

Accident Date: 17/08/2010

Where it occurred: AF/0701/0723, MF289,
Tandan village, Paktya
Province
Primary cause: Field control
inadequacy (?)

Country: Afghanistan

Secondary cause: Management/control
inadequacy (?)

Class: Excavation accident

Date of main report: None

ID original source: None

Name of source: UNMACCA

Organisation: [Name removed]
CBDT
Mine/device: AP blast (unrecorded)

Ground condition: not recorded
Date last modified: 09/07/2011

Date record created:
No of victims: 2

No of documents: 1

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system: Not recorded

Coordinates fixed by:

Map east:

Map north:

Map scale:

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes
inadequate investigation (?)
Inadequate detector pinpointing
protective equipment not worn (?)
visor not worn or worn raised (?)
squatting/kneeling to excavate (?)

Accident report
The only report of this accident that has been made available to date is a UNMACCA Lessons
Learned document. Its conversion into a DDAS file has led to some of the original formatting
being lost. Text in square brackets [ ] is editorial. This record will be revised if more
information becomes available.
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The document is reproduced below, edited for anonymity.
LESSONS LEARNED SUMMARY OF [Demining group] CBDT-15 DMINING ACCIDENT
INTRODUCTION:
Demining investigation team was convened by AMAC Gardez to investigate and find out the
causes of the demining accident involving [the Victim] the deminer of [Demining group]
CBDT-15. As this was a fatal case, so the [Demining group] site officer and QA assistant were
also called to join the investigation process. The accident occurred around 11:00 hours, on 17
August 2010 in Task #AF/0701/0723/MF289 located in Tandan village, centre of Paktya
province.
SUMMARY:
Task #AF/0701/0723/MF289 is located in a hillside, around 13 km towards the Northwest of
Gardez city. The anti-personnel mines were laid there by Russian forces during 1987-1992 to
secure their positions from Mujahidin attacks. The MCPA LIAT conducted a polygon survey in
this area in June 2009.
Mine clearance operations started in this area by [Demining group] as a community based
demining project and the deminers from the community recruited for this operation. On 16th
June 2010 CBDT-15 started demining operations in mentioned mine field. They found and
destroyed 13 anti-personnel mines and cleared 85 % of the area until the accident happened.
On 17 August 2010 while [the Victim] was working in his clearance lane, his excavation tool
touched a mine and caused it to go off. According to the investigation report and the injuries
sustained by victim deminer, it seems that the de-miner has excavated a detected signal
carelessly and in contrary to their SOP. It means signal was not pinpointed correctly and the
de-miner had used the excavation tool directly on the top of mine, so the accident happened.
Unfortunately the de-miner did not put his PPE on, therefore, he got severe injuries on his
eyes, whole face, neck, chest, shoulders, arms, legs and deep wounds on his left ear. The
deminer died in the spot.
CONCLUSIONS:
Carelessness of the de-miner in term of not using his PPE and visor during the operation and
using the excavation tool directly on the top of signal is the main contributing factor to this
accident.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
The following points are to be considered:
•

[Demining group] operations department is recommended to come up with a
comprehensive plan of action for the improvement of command and control in their
demining teams especially for the CBD projects.

•

[Demining group] operations department should plan and implement revision and
refresher trainings for their CBD projects in order to improve the deminers skills, the
plan should be shared with MACCA operations department.

•

[Demining group] should strengthen the internal QA visits to CBD projects to find the
shortcomings and develop the improvement plans accordingly.

Feedback on any preventive and corrective actions taken by [Demining group] is required to
be submitted to the MACCA within 7 days, effective from the issue of this report.
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Victim Report
Victim number: 922

Name: [Name removed]
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: deminer

Fit for work: DECEASED

Compensation: Not made available

Time to hospital: Not made available

Protection issued: Frontal apron

Protection used: None

Long visor

Summary of injuries:
INJURIES: severe Arms; severe Chest; severe Eyes; severe Face; severe Legs; severe Neck
FATAL
COMMENT: No Medical report was made available. "severe injuries on his eyes, whole face,
neck, chest, shoulders, arms, legs and deep wounds on his left ear. The deminer died in the
spot.

Analysis
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a Field Control Inadequacy because the Victim
was working without PPE and his error was not corrected. His failure to pinpoint a detector
reading accurately and excavate safely imply that he was inadequately trained. The
secondary cause is listed as a Management Control Inadequacy because the investigators
found that there was a need for improved training and command and control systems, both of
which are the senior management’s responsibility.
The “Inadequate investigation” listed under notes refers to the absence of a full accident
report. The UN supported MACCA has failed to make these widely available for some years
in contravention of the requirements of the IMAS. National staff have been more responsible
than the internationals with overall responsibility.
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